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Qualia and the Representational Theory of
Phenomenal Character
Tim Klaassen
Representationalism is an inuential theory about the nature of phenomenal
character. Extensive formulations of the theory can be found in (Dretske;
1995) and (Tye; 1995). Much has been written on representationalism since
the publication of these books. However, straightforward and concise char-
acterizations of the theory are hard to nd. In this paper I attempt to give
one such. As you can infer from the references, I have based myself on quite
an extensive amount of literature. My own characterization of representa-
tionalism is the result that you get when you try to distill from it a coherent
and philosophically distinctive theory. It has been my aim to clarify what ex-
actly representationalism is a theory of, which problems it aims to solve, and
how it distinguishes itself from other, alternative, views. Before going into
the theory itself, I shall provide a short sketch of the philosophical context
within which representationalism should be understood. In the second part,
I shall elaborate on representationalism. I conclude with some problems and
complications.
1 Consciousness, Character, and Qualia
We are conscious beings. A powerful way to characterize this fact is to say
that there is something it is like to be us (Nagel; 1974). Put dierently,
existence comes, for us conscious creatures, essentially as a condition that is
in and of itself distinctive. For a rock, to be or not to be does not come with
any marked dierence. For us conscious creatures, however, it does. Look
around you and see how a world of dierent colors and shapes manifests
itself. Attend to your other senses, and notice how dimensions of other kinds
of peculiar qualities are revealed. A world of phenomena discloses itself to
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you. The world reveals to you its appearance. However, only as long as you
are conscious are you able to receive glimpses of it. Because you are conscious,
you are not only aware of the world that surrounds you, you are also aware
of yourself. You experience yourself as a creature with thoughts and feelings.
You have the lucid sense of being animated. You are a self-conscious creature
surrounded by a world that is constituted by all kinds of dierent qualities.
It is this distinctive state that marks your conscious existence. Let us express
all this by saying that you are phenomenally conscious.
In addition to the distinctive state as such, note all the various dierences
that make their appearance within it. We notice smells, sights, sounds, etc.;
dierent qualities that, from moment to moment, enter into our conscious
episodes. Is there not a dierence between the smell of coee and the sound
of falling raindrops against the window? Does not each color has its own
distinct appearance? Does not the world feel to you as made up of dierent
textures? We might say that all these qualities have, each of them, their own
unique phenomenal character. Phenomenal character determines how things
appear and feel to us. One could say that what it is like to be in a phenom-
enally conscious state is simply a matter of how that state is phenomenally
characterized. The nature of phenomenal character will be one of the main
issues of this paper.
Many philosophers now believe that consciousness, the awareness of our-
selves and the world around us, cannot exist independently from our bodies.
They believe that when the body stops functioning, when it dies, phenomenal
consciousness automatically goes with it. If this is true, then our bodies must
somehow be responsible for the coming into existence of conscious experience.
There must be something about the way our bodies function, about the way
they are constituted, that explains why phenomenally conscious states come
into being. However, it has proved to be very dicult to come up with a
satisfactory account of how this works. Indeed, some have even supposed
that phenomenal conscious cannot be something bodily, something physical,
after all.
In his inuential work The Conscious Mind David Chalmers argues that
phenomenal consciousness cannot in fact be something physical (Chalmers;
1996). One of the arguments that he gives in support of this is what has come
to be know as the `Zombie Argument'.1 According to the zombie argument,
it is logically possible for there to be creatures that are completely identical
to us in every bodily aspect without being, at the same time, phenomenally
conscious. These creatures talk and behave in the same way as we do, and
1The term `zombie' was rst introduced in the literature by Robert Kirk (Kirk; 1974).
See also (Block; 1978)
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have complex brains that allow them to respond appropriately to sensory
stimuli. In short, they are physiologically identical to us in every respect.
However, for these creatures, when it comes to the process of living, there is
nothing it is like. To come into existence as a zombie does not mark anything
distinctive. To them, to be born and to die is as close to nothingness as
anything can be. According to Chalmers, the possibility of such creatures
shows that physical processes by themselves are never sucient to realize
phenomenal consciousness. After all, zombies are identical to us in every
physical respect but are nevertheless not phenomenally conscious. To get
physical systems that are also conscious, somehow an extra ingredient is
needed.2
Another inuential argument in support of the thesis that phenomenal
consciousness is not physical is Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument (Jack-
son; 1982). According to the knowledge argument, no matter how much we
know about the physical processes that constitute a conscious organism, no
matter how perfect and complete, it will never give us any knowledge about
the phenomenal character of its conscious states.3 Suppose you have a friend
that has the unique ability to see colors that no one else can see. Indeed,
the physiologist to whom you have taken him for investigation of his condi-
tion, has told you that your friend has a unique extra kind of photoreceptor
that is sensitive to electromagnetic microwaves. Apparently, each time your
friend reports to see the special colors, his extra photoreceptors turn out to
be stimulated by microwaves. Now, it seems that no matter how much you
come to know about the physiological workings of your friend, you will never
know what it is like to see the colors that your friend sees. The phenomenal
fruit is not known by the physical tree. According to Jackson, this can only
mean that, since ex hypothesi you know everything there is to know about
2Whether or not such creatures are really possible is controversial. The argument that
Chalmers puts forward in support of the thesis that zombies are possible is that we can
conceive of such creatures. That is, it seems that, unlike square circles, we do not have
diculty imagining such creatures. Some, however, have argued that we may not always
be right about what we think we are conceiving (Tye; 1986). Others have questioned the
very validity of the inference from conceivability to possibility (Hill; 1997).
3A similar argument is given in (Nagel; 1974). Also, we might say that the knowledge
argument not only seems to show that physical knowledge does not give us knowledge
about phenomenal character, but that it also does not show that an organism is phenom-
enally conscious at all. In this way the knowledge argument also closely resembles the
zombie argument. However, Jackson himself thinks that Nagel's argument and the knowl-
edge argument are really very dierent arguments. Personally, I don't really see this. I do
think however, and I shall elaborate on this shortly, that we can conceptually distinguish
between questions that pertain to whether or not phenomenal consciousness is present,
and questions about the specic character of phenomenally conscious states.
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the physical, phenomenal consciousness must be non-physical.
Both Chalmers and Jackson draw conclusions about the metaphysical na-
ture of phenomenal consciousness. They both argue that phenomenal con-
sciousness is non-physical. This is partly what makes their arguments so
controversial. However, one can believe in the physical nature of phenom-
enal consciousness and still recognize that there is a fundamental diculty
when it comes to providing a satisfactory explanation of this. This view
is advocated by Joseph Levine.4 According to Levine, even if phenomenal
consciousness is in reality nothing but the natural result of certain physical
processes, there will nevertheless remain a signicant explanatory gap when
it comes to our understanding of this fact.5 This is illustrated by the simple
fact that, for all we know, zombies at least seem possible to us. Somehow,
the kind of impossibility-bells that start to ring as soon as we try to conceive
of a square circle do not go o when we try to conceive of a zombie. Although
from this nothing strictly follows about the actual nature of phenomenal con-
sciousness, Levine maintains that it does show that our comprehension may
not be optimally suited to aid our further understanding of it. Levine himself
uses phenomenal-physical identities such as `pain = the ring of c-bers in
the brain' to make his point.6 According to Levine, even if identities such as
these hold true in the physical world, we still would not know why that is
so. How can it be that the ring of c-bers is one and the same thing as the
phenomenal feeling of painfulness? What is it about the ring of c-bers in
the brain such that it is a conscious experience with a particular phenomenal
character? Although in reality pain may be nothing but the ring of c-bers
in the brain, we simply do not have a grasp of how this is possible.
In light of these considerations, we can distinguish two questions that a suc-
cessful physicalistic theory of phenomenal consciousness must answer. The
rst of these we might call the `Existence Question'. It concerns why, given all
the (micro)physical facts that constitute biological organisms, there should
appear anything at all, rather than nothing. What is the mechanism that
causes sheer matter in motion to ignite and light up into the experiential
rework of our phenomenal world? The second question we might call the
`Character Question'. The character question is not so much concerned with
the circumstance that things phenomenally appear, but with the way how
they appear. The conscious episodes that constitute our daily lives acquaint
us with various ranges of dierent qualities, each of which have their own
4See (Levine; 1983) and (Levine; 1993)
5A similar view is held by the philosopher Colin McGinn, see e.g. (McGinn; 1989)
6Elsewhere, Levine presents a similar story about functional accounts of consciousness
(Levine; 1995).
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unique phenomenal character (compare the color of a rose with the smell of
tobacco). The character question is concerned with the factors that deter-
mine, or condition, phenomenal character.
In what follows we shall be mainly concerned with this second ques-
tion, the one which deals with the phenomenal character of phenomenally
conscious states. More specically our interest is in examining a theory
called `Represenationalism'. Representationalism is a philosophical theory
that aims to provide an account of what phenomenal character is.7 In other
words, it purports to give us an answer to the character question. But before
we start our examination, I want to say a little bit more about this problem
of phenomenal character. For it may not be suciently clear yet why, indeed,
there might be something problematic about the way things appear to us.
How could there be anything mysterious about the way the world, and
the things in it, appear to us? After all, chocolate tastes the way it does
simply because chocolate tastes that way. And roses smell and look the way
they do simply because roses smell and look that way. More generally, the
reason why the world appears the way it does is simply because the world
is that way. In other words, how things get their phenomenal character is
not something that is immediately relevant to the problem of how biological
systems generate phenomenal consciousness. The mystery of consciousness
is not how things appear but only that things appear.
Things might not be as straightforward as they seem. Consider the fact
that as human beings we perceive the world through ve dierent senses.
The phenomenal appearance of the world does not simply hang in thin air,
but is thoroughly mediated by the complex physiological processes that con-
stitute our sensory systems. Hence, it seems then that what we perceive is
(presumably) the product of a complex physiological process. Notice also
that the kind of appearances that come with each of your dierent senses
dier radically from one another with respect to their phenomenal character.
Attend to the things that you see, and attend to the things that you hear,
and compare what you nd in each of these instances. Is not seeing entirely
dierent from hearing? Does not each come, as it were, with its own \style"?
Seeing seems to be characterized by a general quality of \visualness" and
hearing seems to be characterized by a general quality of \auditoriness". A
similar thing holds for the other sensory modalities. Each of them has its
own peculiar phenomenal atmosphere.
In response to this, one might suppose that how the world appears to
us is largely determined by the kind of senses that we happen to perceive
7Explicit statements about representationalism as an account of phenomenal character
can be found in (Tye; 2002, Ch. 3) and (Carruthers; 2000, Ch. 5).
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with. More specically, one might suppose that each of the senses themselves
shape the phenomenal character of our conscious states in such a way that
the phenomenal qualities that they give rise to are not so much the result
of what the senses perceive, as much as they are a direct result of how they
perceive.8 Alternatively, one perhaps imagines that phenomenal features
are really only the eects that external objects cause in us as a result of
the manner in which they strike our senses. That is, given the intricate
causal chains that underlie the physical process of perception, one might be
tempted to think that what we are presented with in experience is in fact
merely the end result of the causal chain and not the original thing that
initiates it by stimulating our senses.9 In any case, the idea here is that the
physiological process of sense-perception itself gives rise to its own unique
set of phenomenal feels. We might call such phenomenal features `qualia'.
More specically, as I shall explain later, they are often dened as intrinsic,
non-representational properties of experiences.10
The problem of qualia (if there are such) is that they do not seem to
bear any intelligible relation to the physical world. First of all, they do
not tell us anything about how the world is. After all, how they appear to
us is not the result of what our senses perceive, but is a result of how the
senses are aected, caused, or struck into activity. It seems as though they
just present us with what you might call \phenomenal noise". Also, since
these phenomenal features do not bear directly on how the world is, there
are no traces of them in the physical universe prior to the origination of
phenomenal consciousness in biological creatures. Therefore, the diculty
consists in how to trace qualia back to the non-phenomenal realm out of
which they emerge. Qualia only exist to the extent that they appear in
consciousness. Outside of consciousness there is simply nothing else like
them. The fact that, on this picture, qualia particularly arise as the result
of certain (cosmologically recent) physiological processes or activities does
not help make their phenomenal character appear more intelligible. For the
question remains as to why these activities give rise to one set of qualia
rather than another, or indeed, why they should give rise to any qualia at
all. Again we are faced with an explanatory gap. If there are such things as
8The adverbial theory of perception seems to be committed to such a view. See e.g.
(Chisholm; 1957).
9The British empiricists, for example, seem to have thought along these lines. See e.g.
(Locke; 2008, Book II, Ch. VIII and IX), (Hume; 2003, Book I, part IV, Ch. II), and
(Reid; 1915, Ch. 2 and 3).
10There is a lot of confusion that surrounds the term `qualia'. For two very useful articles,
see (Martin; 1998) and (Crane; 2000). Denitions of qualia as specically intrinsic and
non-intentional can be found in (Peacocke; 1983) and (Block; 2003).
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qualia, they just seem to pop up spontaneously into existence. Depending
on whether they actually do anything, they seem either strongly emergent or
simply epiphenomenal.11 In either case, what makes qualia appear the way
they do is simply a brute fact that resists further explanation.
2 The Representational Theory of Phenome-
nal Character
One diculty that arises in getting a clear articulation of representational-
ism is the fact that there are several dierent versions of it. Also, dierent
philosophers seem to have dierent ways of taxonomizing these dierent ver-
sions.12 Related to this is also the circumstance that there is an important
ambiguity in talk about the \representational" status of phenomenal char-
acter. The ambiguity is between the content that is represent-ed and the
vehicle that is doing the represent-ing. I will come back to this later. Let
me stipulate rst that I am mainly concerned here with a version of rep-
resentationalism that has been proposed by Fred Dretske and Michael Tye
(Dretske; 1995), (Tye; 1995, 2002), a view that is sometimes known as `strong
representationalism'.
According to strong representationalism, the phenomenal character of a
phenomenally conscious state is wholly given by the representational con-
tent which is carried by that state. It is important to note that this is not
a supervenience thesis about the relationship between the phenomenal and
the representational. Instead, according to strong representationalism the
phenomenal can be reduced to the representational. In this way it hopes
to explain phenomenal character in terms of representational content. Ac-
cording to strong representationalism, phenomenal character is nothing over
and above representational content; i.e., the representational exhausts the
phenomenal. Therefore, there can be no dierence in phenomenal charac-
ter without there also being a dierence in representational content. Strong
representationalism may be characterized by the following two theses:
1. The Representational Thesis: Phenomenally conscious states have
representational content.
11See (Chalmers; 2006) and (Kim; 2006) for the concept of emergence and its possi-
ble relationship to phenomenal consciousness. See (Jackson; 1982) for an epiphenomenal
account of qualia.
12Compare e.g. (Byrne; 2001), (Block; 2003), (Chalmers; 2004),(Kind; 2007), (Seager
and Bourget; 2007), (Tye; 2009), (Fish; 2010), and (Bourget and Mendelovici; 2013)
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2. The Identity Thesis: The phenomenal character of a conscious state
is identical to the representational content of that state.
The rst thesis gives us representationalism, while the second thesis gives
us strong representationalism. In what follows, I shall try to elucidate what
is meant by these theses. It will also allow me to say something more about
the ambiguity that I mentioned that comes with talk about the \representa-
tional" status of phenomenal character.
2.1 The Representational Thesis
The representational thesis states that phenomenally conscious states have
representational content. Another common way to express this is to say that
phenomenally conscious states have \intentional" content. But what exactly
does this mean? One inuential account of the representational thesis is
given by Alex Byrne (Byrne; 2001). According to that account, to say that
phenomenally conscious states have representational content means nothing
more than that phenomenally conscious states make the world seem a certain
way. For example, suppose you perceive a certain shade of blue and smell
some pleasing odor, then it will seem to you as if the world contains something
blue and something pleasingly smelling. Also, change the color and the smell,
and how the world seems to you will also change. More generally, change
any aspect of the phenomenal character of a conscious state, and how the
world seems will automatically change with it.
Can this really be what (strong) representationalists mean by the repre-
sentational thesis? What does it mean to deny that phenomenal character
xes the way the world seems to us? Is this not almost trivially true? Does
not talk about phenomenal character in terms of \what-it-is-like" already
imply that we really mean to talk about the way things seem and feel to
us? In any case, it is hard to see how the representational thesis, interpreted
in this way, can be the kind of thesis that is philosophically substantial;
something which philosophers can disagree about.13 It is also worth noticing
that although Byrne identies the representational with the phenomenal, he
also thinks that this is compatible with the view that there are such things
as qualia. However, when you read the literature carefully, you will nd
that strong representationalism is put forward precisely as a way of avoiding
having to deal with such entities.The kind of identity that strong representa-
tionalists suppose to hold between the phenomenal and the representational
13Some explicitly deny the representational thesis, but it does not seem to me that they
deny that phenomenal character is responsible for making things seem a certain way. See
e.g. (Travis; 2004) and (Brewer; 2006).
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must therefore be something dierent from the kind of identity that Byrne
supposes to hold.14 In short, we need a construal of the representational
thesis that is somehow stronger than the seemingly trivial thesis that phe-
nomenal states make things seem a certain way.
A close reading of the literature on representationalism suggests that what
is usually meant by the representational thesis is that phenomenal states are
intrinsically truth-conditional.15 This idea comes from a certain strategy to
deal with the ontological problems that seem to arise out of phenomenal
states that are illusory or hallucinatory.16 It oers an alternative to the
strategy that is described by the Sense-data Theory, which was a popular
theory of perception in the beginning of the 20th century.
The sense-data theory, as it is now usually understood, is essentially
committed to what is known as the `Phenomenal Principle'.17 The principle
states that when there phenomenally appears something to have property p,
there must actually be something that is p. Suppose you have a hallucination
as of a pink elephant. This means that although there phenomenally appears
to be a pink elephant in front of you, no such thing is actually there in your
physical environment. The phenomenal principle says that, since something
pink and elephant-shaped appears to you, there must actually be something
that has those properties. Since there is no physical pink elephant, that
which is pink and elephant-shaped must instead be something mental, a
mental sense-datum that is pink and elephant-shaped.
On this approach, phenomenal states do not have the ability to \lie" to
us, since what phenomenally appears must always in some sense actually
be the case. Therefore, in cases where we do feel deceived by appearances,
we cannot blame the appearances themselves, but only ourselves for having
formed false judgments about them. On this view, phenomenal states are in
and of themselves not truth-conditional. Only our beliefs have the property
of being true or false, not our experiences.
The idea that whatever appears must actually exist does not sit well
with many philosophers. Especially because it involves a commitment to
non-physical entities, and because many philosophers want to think that
everything there is is physical. The representational approach to illusions and
hallucinations is designed to solve these ontological extravagances. According
to the representational approach, phenomenal states are a kind of belief-
states. Beliefs can be either true or false. Moreover, from the fact that p is
14See (Fish; 2010, Ch. 5) for a formulation of this dierence.
15see e.g. (Dretske; 2003), (Jackson; 2004), (Seager and Bourget; 2007), (Tye; 2009),
and (Crane; 2009)
16See (Anscombe; 1965) and (Hintikka; 1969), and(Harman; 1990).
17See (Robinson; 1994).
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believed to be true, it does not follow that p is actually true. Furthermore,
if a belief turns out to be false, we do not need to commit ourselves to the
existence of what was falsely believed. Therefore, if one treats phenomenal
states as themselves capable of being either true or false, one has a way to
circumvent the phenomenal principle. Phenomenal states that are illusory
or hallucinatory are like false beliefs and, consequently, what phenomenally
appears in them need not actually exist.
Thus, according to the representational approach, phenomenal states are
in and of themselves truth-conditional. In other words, when you are un-
der a perceptual illusion or when you are suering from hallucinations, the
source of error does lie in the phenomenal states themselves rather than in
any judgments about them on your part. The representational approach to
phenomenal states accomplishes that we do no have to deal with phenomenal
items that are purely mental.
But a question remains: how does this bear on phenomenal character?
After all, on the face of it, it seems that the fact that some things have the
ability to be true or false does not in and of itself explain \what they are
like". However, there is an intimate link between truth-conditionality and
phenomenal character. This will become clear if we take a closer look at
the ambiguity that is involved in talk about the \representational" status of
phenomenal character. This also brings us to the Identity Thesis; the second
main thesis of strong representationalism.
2.2 The Identity Thesis
In talking about representation, we can either mean the vehicle that is doing
the represent-ing, or we can talk about the content itself that is represent-ed.
The thesis that phenomenal states carry representational content similarly
lends itself to two dierent interpretations. Either, it means that phenom-
enal qualities are the vehicles that do the representing, or it can mean that
phenomenal qualities themselves directly present us with aspects of the con-
tent itself. In order to keep clear about this distinction, we may want to
distinguish between vehicle-based representationalism and content-based rep-
resentationalism.18
It should be clear that on a vehicle-based approach to phenomenal char-
acter, there is no problem in holding that what appears to us in illusion and
hallucination does in fact exist. To see why this is so, consider the expression
`The Eiel tower is made of plastic'. Although this proposition is in fact false,
the set of words by which this proposition is expressed on paper, the pattern
18I borrow this distinction from Brad Thompson (Thompson; 2008)
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of ink that you see above, nevertheless exists. Similarly, on a vehicle-based
reading of phenomenal states, one could say that in cases of illusion and
hallucination, although that which the phenomenal conguration in question
stands for is in fact nonexistent, the \phenomenal ink" itself nevertheless
exists. Clearly then, one can only circumvent the phenomenal principle by
giving a representational account of phenomenal character that is content-
based. As a matter of fact, this is exactly what strong representationalism
is committed to. This brings us to the identity thesis.
But rst, recall what has been said about qualia. As I have tried to
explain, the problem of qualia is that they do not seem to bear any intelligible
relationship to the non-phenomenal world out of which they (allegedly) arise.
In light of what has been said, one might frame part of the qualia problem
in terms of the question to what extent a phenomenal state really presents
us with a kind of ink pattern; a set of phenomenal features which are really
just representational vehicles. Phenomenal character would then consist of
properties that are, in a sense, merely symbolic. The relation between qualia
and the physical world would then be similar to the relation between a symbol
and the content that it stands for.19
Consider the following two linguistic expressions:
i Amsterdam is the capital of the Netherlands
ii @&K @/
IS .ºé'
Both (i) and (ii) express the proposition that Amsterdam is the capital of the
Netherlands. This is the content of (i) and (ii). Notice that, qua symbolic
structure, (i) and (ii) have very dierent appearances. What is also important
is that there is no intrinsic relation between (i) and (ii) and the content that
Amsterdam is the capital of the Netherlands. After all, (i) and (ii) are
in and of themselves merely two random patterns of ink with no intrinsic
meaning of their own. It seems that (i) and (ii) only carry a content because
they have been assigned that role by the English and Japanese language
communities. We could say therefore that symbolic structures such as (i)
and (ii) are intrinsically non-representational, and that they only get their
representational status by being part of some representational system. Also,
it seems that anything whatsoever can be assigned the role of standing for
something else. This basically means that the intrinsic properties of these
symbols themselves can never explain the particular content that they stand
19Ned Block uses the term `mental paint' to refer to qualia that play a merely symbolic
role. He distinguishes these from qualia that are not even symbolic; he labels these `mental
oil' (Block; 2003). I prefer the terms `phenomenal ink' and `phenomenal noise'.
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for. Indeed, closely examining such intrinsic properties does not even allow
us to deduce that they stand for anything at all. When it comes to an
explanation of the symbolic status of some object, the intrinsic qualities of
that object are neither necessary nor sucient. Heck, if we did not know any
better, we might even come to think that there is some kind of explanatory
gap between symbols and their meanings!
If there are such phenomenal features as qualia shaping the phenomenal
character of our conscious lives, then the situation seems similar to the one
described above. If we suppose that certain phenomenal features are merely
representational vehicles, then such phenomenal features are really a kind
of symbols that only contingently relate to their representational contents.
This means that the intrinsic qualities that dene their character are neither
necessary nor sucient to explain the contents for which they stand.20 How-
ever, not only is it impossible to get from phenomenal symbol to represented
world, there is also, as I have already pointed out, no obvious link between
world and symbol. For as Jackson's knowledge argument supposedly shows,
nothing physical can teach us about what qualia are like. Of course, this has
partly to do with the fact that qualia are by denition non-representational;
i.e., no instances of them exist in the non-phenomenal realm.
According to the knowledge argument, the non-phenomenal world cannot
tell us what qualia are like. But conversely, and equally problematically,
qualia themselves also do not show us how the world really is. To the extent
that qualia shape phenomenal character, the world that appears to us is
merely a symbol. And as we have seen, there is no intrinsic connection
between a symbol and that which it stands for.
Strong representationalism aims to eliminate these problems by holding
that phenomenal character is identical to representational content (the iden-
tity thesis). This implies that there are no phenomenal features that are
not in fact representational in a content-based manner. It also means that
each and every phenomenal detail of a phenomenal state, each \phenomenal
pixel", directly presents us with a condition that must be fullled in order
for the phenomenal state to be veridical.21 In short, if you smell the scent
20This is basically what spectrum inversions amount to (See e.g. (Shoemaker; 1982)
and(Shoemaker; 1990)). The idea here is that the phenomenal colors that appear to us
in vision are in fact representational vehicles, and relate only contingently to the environ-
mental features that they stand for within the representational economy of an organism.
On this view, phenomenal color does not in and of itself bear on representational content.
Qualia realists might say a similar thing about other phenomenal features.
21Frank Jackson gives a lucid expression of this idea: \...there is a marked contrast be-
tween, on the one hand, the way familiar representational devices like maps and sentences
represent, and, on the other, the way perceptual experiences represents. There is a gap
between vehicle of representation and what is represented in the rst kind of case that does
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of a rose, then in order for your experience to be veridical, there must be
something like that out there in the world.
This explains why from the point of view of strong representationalism
there is an intimate connection between truth-conditionality and phenomenal
character. On a content-based account, phenomenal characters do not merely
contingently relate to their contents. This is because phenomenal charac-
ters are the contents themselves. To the extent that phenomenal states are
veridical, phenomenal character simply shows us how the world is. Sydney
Shoemaker puts it intuitively when he says that strong representationalism
solves the problem of phenomenal character by \kicking phenomenal char-
acter downstairs, into the external world" (Shoemaker; 2003, 256). On this
view, there are no such things as qualia; phenomenal features that are only
instantiated as a function of representational processes. Therefore, if strong
representationalism is true then we do not have to account for any myste-
rious emergent or epiphenomenal qualities that spontaneously pop up into
existence; qualities that have as much resemblance to the world out of which
they arise as a symbol has to the content for which it stands. Phenomenal
characters are simply a \subset of objective physical properties" (Dretske;
2003, p. 67). They simply tell us what the world looks, sounds, tastes,
smells, and feels like. Again, the mystery of phenomenal consciousness does
not lie in how things appear, but in the fact that they appear at all.22
3 But Is It True?
We now have available to us a straightforward characterization of strong rep-
resentationalism. The only thing that is left is determining whether it is also
a good theory. This brings us to an evaluation of some of the arguments that
not exist in the second.In the case of maps and sentences, we can distinguish the features
that do the representing { the gaps between the isobars on a weather map, the presence
of the letters `c', `a', and `t' in that order of a sentence, the green colouring on parts of
a map, etc. { from what they represent: a pressure gradient, a certain animal, areas of
high rainfall, etc. We can, for example, describe the gap between the isobars without any
reference to what it represents. In the case of perceptual experience, we cannot. When I
have an experience of a round, red shape, that is what it represents. My very description
of the vehicle of the representation delivers how it represents things to be. I may or may
not accept that things are the way they are being represented to be, but there is just one
way that things are being represented to be, and that way is an essential feature of the
experience." (Jackson; 2004, p. 109-110)
22\A representational theory of experience doesn't, I admit, solve the \hard" problem of
consciousness. It bridges this explanatory gap only by opening up an equally puzzling gap
somewhere else: how do electrical and chemical events in gray soggy brain stu manage
to represent bright orange pumpkins?" (Dretske; 2003, 71-72)
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strong representationalists put forward in support of their views. We shall be
especially concerned with the so-called \Argument from Transparency". I be-
lieve the argument does not establish what strong representationalism wants
it to establish. In addition to this, I shall evaluate the representational thesis
by giving some examples of phenomenal states that, on the face of it, do not
seem to be truth-conditional in the way that is required. I conclude with
some doubts regarding the explanatory power of a strong representational
approach to phenomenal character.
3.1 The Argument from Transparency
One of the main arguments for strong representationalism is the observation
that experience seems to be transparant (Tye; 2002). As your eyes follow
these words, you are aware of the phenomenal whiteness of the page and the
words with which this sentence ends. You are aware that dierent phenom-
enal characters make their appearance to you. Nothing out of the ordinary;
you just have a visual experience of the page that is in front of you. But
now the task is as follows. Rather than attending to the page and the words,
try to shift your attention to the experience itself. That is, try not to focus
on what your experience is of but try to focus on the experience itself apart
from that. Try not to pay attention to the content of your experience, but
try to see if you can discern the experiential medium (the representational
vehicle) that facilitates this representation. Can you do this? Can you nd
any phenomenal qualities that belong to the experience itself rather than the
things your experience is of?
Strong representationalists claim that you will not be able to do this. Ac-
cording to them, there are no such extra phenomenal features discernible to
us. Experiences are transparent to us. That is, introspection of one's experi-
ence only reveals phenomenal aspects of what the experience is of ; there are
no further phenomenal features over and above these. In other words, we are
not aware of any properties of experience. What having a certain experience
is like is entirely given by what the experience is of. Apart from that, nothing
else shapes what it is like to have a certain experience. In other words, there
are no such things as qualia. Phenomenal character is identical to repre-
sentational content, and is therefore wholly exhausted by such content. One
could say that all we are presented with is the message, but not the medium.
There is no \phenomenal noise" or \phenomenal ink" intervening, so to say.
All we can discern are the qualities objects are represented as having.
What exactly are we being asked to do when we are being asked to shift
our attention from what our experience is of to the experience itself? And
how does our failure to do this plead for the strong representationalist's
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supposition that there are no such things as qualia?
There are several things one can think of in response to the rst question.
If we analyze a sentence such as `I am seeing the tree', we notice that it is
on a par with sentences such as `I am handing over the bottle' or `I am
catching the ball'. These sentences have in common that they all make
mention of a subject, an act, and some object. In the last two examples, one
can easily discern the act from the object. When you hand over a bottle, you
can easily distinguish between the bottle itself, and the act of you handing
over it. In general, it seems that we can easily distinguish objects and the
acts that are applied to them. It is natural to suppose that a similar thing
holds for perceptual acts, and that we should be able to distinguish the
perceived object from the act of perceiving it. Thus, this may be one way to
understand what is meant when we are being asked to shift our attention to
the experience itself; forget the experiential objects for a moment, and try
to focus and the act of seeing itself.
Alternatively, we might imagine the task we are being asked to perform as
follows. Normally, we take the objects of vision to be \out there". That is, we
take vision to present us with a three-dimensional scene with various depths
and distances that is \beyond our skulls". Philosophical reection, however,
may convince us that what we are acquainted with in visual perception is
really an internal mental panorama that is two-dimensional ; i.e., an internal
mental at-screen without depth or distance.23 On this account, perceptual
experience only makes us indirectly aware of the external world by making
us directly aware of an inner mental representation of that world. The world
that was always so familiar to us turns out to be nothing but a projection
on an internal mental at-screen.
If we adopt this picture of experience, we might conceive of the task we
are being asked to perform as follows. Instead of just being in our usual
state of mind, in which we are wholly immersed in our experiences and take
the world that we perceive as being \out there", we must try, as it were, to
\take a step back" and detach ourselves from our experiences, so that they
may reveal themselves as merely projections on a internal mental atscreen,
something whose properties we can then inspect.
When you actually try any of these things, i.e., inspecting your experi-
ence qua experience, you will nd that you indeed encounter some sort of
strange resistance. According to Michael Tye, when we actually encounter
this resistance, we basically discover that all there is to see are how things
are represented as being. As soon as we try to introspect our experience qua
23See for example George Berkeley's An Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision (Berke-
ley; 2008)
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experience, we nd our attention immediately reinforced to have its focus
exclusively on the objects that the experience is of. Our gaze seems to be
stuck onto the objects of the experience and cannot detach itself from them.
It seems we cannot simply inspect and explore our experiences in the way
we would inspect and explore ordinary objects. Normally when we want to
examine some object, we can walk around it or pick it up so as to examine
its dierent aspects. But such a procedure seems impossible when it comes
to our experience. It seems somewhat comparable to the ever shifting of the
horizon as we try to approach it; as much as we try to come closer, its ap-
pearance remains unaltered. Similarly, as much as we try to introspect our
experiences, they forever escape us. The only dierence is that when we try
to inspect our experience, we try to create some distance instead of diminish-
ing it. But as soon as we try to step back, the experiential objects themselves
seem to move with us. We cannot escape; besides the visual scenery that is
presented \in front of us", there is simply nowhere else to look and nothing
else to see!
The argument from transparency basically states that when you intro-
spect your experience, all you nd are the intentional objects that the expe-
rience is of. Apart from that, there is nothing else phenomenally present to
you. But does this observation really establish that there are no such things
as qualia?
The strong representationalist appeals to the observation that, apart from
the things that an experience is of, nothing is phenomenally present that
indicates the properties of the experience itself. However, a similar point
can also be made in the opposite direction. Instead of trying to attend to
your experience apart from the objects your experience is of, see if you can
attend to these objects themselves apart from your experiencing of those
objects. That is, can you nd any object that is not in fact experienced by
you? I don't think you can. In other words, although introspection only
reveals the properties the experience is of, these properties themselves are all
nevertheless necessarily experienced properties. But what does this mean?
First of all, it does not in and of itself imply that all phenomenal qualities
consist in their being experienced. The fact that, necessarily, an experienced
property is an experienced property, does not mean that an experienced
property is necessarily an experienced property. Moreover, even if certain
properties consist in their being experienced, it is unclear whether this allows
us to say that such properties are properties of experiences. For to say that
a property p can only be instantiated as experienced merely seems to imply
that `being experienced' is an essential property of p; it is unclear if this also
allows us to say that p is a property of an experience. However, I believe
that if we allow that certain phenomenal qualities are only instantiated as
16
features of an experience, such properties might reasonably be regarded as
properties of experience. In any case, if there indeed are such phenomenal
qualities, strong representationalism will be in trouble anyhow.
Before going into this , we should ask whether we should indeed suppose
that certain phenomenal qualities can only be instantiated as contents of an
experience. Also, I should explain why such phenomenal qualities might be
regarded as properties of experiences. Let me start with the rst question.
Are there phenomenal qualities that depend for their instantiation on being
experienced? That is, are there phenomenal qualities that only exist within
experience and not outside of it? It is fairly clear that there are such phe-
nomenal qualities. Consider, for example, the feeling of pain. It seems that
pains can only exist as contents of an experience. Ask yourself, can there
be pains when there is nothing around to feel them? It seems natural to
suppose that they cannot. After all, pains that are not felt cannot really be
painful. But pain is painfulness! In short, pains consist in their being expe-
rienced. So painfulness is essentially a phenomenal quality; it can only exist
to the extent that its phenomenal feel is consciously suered by some entity.
In short, painfulness is the feeling of painfulness. A similar thing holds for
bodily sensations in general, and other aective states such as emotions and
moods. These all come with their own unique phenomenal characters, and
can only survive as the inhabitants of phenomenal states of experience.
Can we really maintain with respect to pains and other aective states
that experience is transparent? I have already said that, given the fact that
p is essentially experienced, it does not follow that p is a property of an
experience. After all, the fact that my car has the property of being red
also does not mean that my car is a property of redness. However, if pain is
not a property of an experience, then what else could it be a property of?
Although, as we shall see, strong representationalists seem to think otherwise,
I believe there are simply no sensible alternatives available. Perhaps it should
also be pointed out that the word `experience' might signify dierent things
to dierent people and that, therefore, the notion of a `property of experience'
can also be taken to mean dierent things.24 For example, one might take
`experience' to mean the experienced objects rather than the brain-states that
represents these objects. If this meaning is adopted, then all phenomenal
qualities that we experience are `properties of experiences'. Clearly then, in
this sense there are properties of experiences.
Of course, in and of itself this admission is not necessarily problematic for
24Daniel Stoljar points out that G.E. Moore used the term `experience' to refer to ex-
perienced objects while contemporary theorists such as Ned Block and Sydney Shoemaker
use it to refer to brain-states(Stoljar; 2004).
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the strong representationalist, for he or she can say that although the quali-
ties that we experience are properties of experiences, they are only properties
of experiences as long as the experiences last, and that outside of experiences
these qualities have an independent existence in the physical world. How-
ever, if it turns out that some of these qualities do not exist independently
of being experienced, the strong representationalist must give an account
of how exactly such phenomenal qualities are dependent for their existence
on experiential processes. The only possible account, it seems, is that such
phenomenal qualities are in fact the result of experiential processes. It is
reasonable to regard them as properties of experience.
We may want to reject the application of the concept `property of expe-
rience' to pains and other aective states. Perhaps because, although their
phenomenal natures cannot exist apart from experience, they are still essen-
tially qualities experiences are of. However, whether or not, for whichever
reason, one denies that we are aware of `properties of experiences', the phe-
nomenal characters of aective states do present strong representationalism
with a serious diculty. This is because the experienced qualities of which
they consist are irreducibly phenomenal. But before going into this, let me
rst address some issues that complicate the representational thesis which
says that all phenomenal states are representational.
3.2 Do All Phenomenal States Have Truth-Conditions?
As we have seen, the representational thesis states that phenomenal states
are intrinsically truth-conditional. For example, when you are visually pre-
sented with an apple tree in front of you, while in fact there is no such thing
as an apple tree in front of you, then your visual experience is false. Phenom-
enal states represent to us how things in the world stand, i.e., they purport
to represent what the world is like. But from the fact that a phenomenal
state represents the world in a certain way, it does not follow that the world
actually is that way. In this respect, phenomenal states are like beliefs; they
are either true or false. Moreover, just like beliefs, when phenomenal states
represent falsely, we need not commit ourselves to the existence of what is
thus falsely represented. Furthermore, the truth-conditional status of phe-
nomenal states is able to explain phenomenal character; phenomenal states
that represent truly simply show us what the physical world is like.
Is it true that all phenomenal states have truth conditions? A closer
look at the nature of bodily sensations, emotions, and moods shows that,
at the very least, this is complicated. For example, it seems that when you
are suering from pain, then you are simply suering from pain. That is,
nothing in the world can make it the case that you are not suering from
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pain after all. In this sense, pains can be said to be self-intimating. In
order for pain to be the case, mere appearance already suces. Pains seem
presentational rather than re-presentational and do not seem to admit of a
distinction between appearance and reality.25
Pains and other bodily sensations may not be the greatest obstacles to an
unrestricted application of the representational thesis. For example, Michael
Tye points out that we never just feel pain tout court (Tye; 2006). When
we feel pain, the pain is always represented to be located at a particular
place. That is, pains represent physiological disturbances in certain parts
of our bodies. This allows pains to be treated in truth-conditional terms.
Take for example someone who experiences a phantom limb pain in the right
arm. Although the pain represents that there is some kind of physiological
disturbance in the right arm, the representation is false since the person to
whom this content is represented does not have a right arm. Of course to
the person who suers from it, phantom limb pain is still painful. However,
the pain is nevertheless illusory because it provides inadequate information;
it misrepresents how things in the world stand. In this sense, pains are
truth-conditional. A similar thing holds for bodily sensations in general.
In response to this, one could object that even though pain states have
the ability to misrepresent, it would nevertheless be mistaken to suppose
that in cases of misrepresentation no actual pain exists. As I have explained,
according to representationalism, when a phenomenal state misrepresents,
one need not commit oneself to the existence of what was falsely represented.
For example, when you have a hallucination as of a pink elephant, there is
no reason to believe in the actual existence of what your hallucination is
of. However, the situation is dierent with pain; even when the pain-state
misrepresents how things stand, the painfulness of the pain is still there. And
since painfulness is pain, it is absurd to deny the existence of actual pain in
the case of misrepresentation. So although pains may, in a sense, be truth-
conditional, this does not bring with it the kind of ontological parsimony
that it does in other cases of misrepresentation.
But even if strong representationalism succeeds in treating pains and
other bodily sensations in truth-conditional terms, is it also able to handle
emotions and moods?
Let me note, rst, that the discussion about whether or not emotions and
moods can be accommodated by strong representationalism usually centers
around the issue of whether or not emotions and moods are typically about
or directed at something. Those who frame the issue like this might claim,
25For convenience, in the remainder of this article I shall continue to refer to refer to
pains and other aective conditions as `representational'.
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for example, that e.g. emotions are not representational because they are
not about anything. In the recent literature, the same issue about moods
is taken up in (Kind; 2013) and (Mendelovici; 2013). This is however very
dierent from the issue of whether or not emotions and moods have truth-
conditions. To appreciate this dierence, a distinction must be made between
treating emotions and moods as representational contents and treating them
as attitudes toward certain specic representational contents. Let me explain.
Talk of the representational capacities of our minds is often formulated
in terms of `intentionality', which is conceived of as the mind's ability to
`direct' itself to, or be `about', things other than itself. For example, one can
think that Amsterdam is the capital city of the Netherlands, in which case
one's thinking is about, or directed towards, Amsterdam. Indeed, thoughts
are paradigmatically intentional.
In relation to this, a distinction is usually made between intentional acts
and intentional contents.26 The idea here is that dierent intentional acts can
be directed at one and the same content. For example, one can believe that
Amsterdam is the capital city of the Netherlands, but one can also wish, doubt
or imagine that Amsterdam is the capital city of the Netherlands. Similarly,
one can say that perceiving and thinking are dierent ways in which the mind
is directed at certain contents.
Contemporary discussions, such as the one between Kind and Mende-
lovici, seem to be centered mainly around the issue of whether moods (sensa-
tions, emotions) are essentially about something. The issue is about whether
or not moods and emotions are species of intentional acts.27 However, even
if moods and emotions are always intentionally directed, this does not say
anything about the dierent natures of emotions and moods themselves. For
example, although it could very well be the case that instances of happiness
and sadness must always be directed at something, this doesn't tell us any-
thing about what it means to be happy about p in contradistinction to being
sad about p. To put it in terms of phenomenal character; there seems to be a
phenomenal dierence between being happy about p and being sad about p.
But this phenomenal dierence cannot be explained in terms of the content
to which these aective states are directed, for they are directed at the same
content.
The phenomenal dierence between various moods and emotions, con-
sidered as intentional acts, cannot be fully accounted for in terms of the
representational contents to which they direct themselves. So even if emo-
26See e.g. (Crane; 2009) for a nice exposition.
27To be sure, there is no doubt that at least sometimes we can be moody about this or
that; the controversy pertains to whether or not moods are always in this way directed.
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tions and moods are always intentionally directed, this doesn't yet account
for the basis of their mutual phenomenal dierences.28 And it is the latter
issue that we are concerned with.
You may be angry about the fact that someone has stolen your lunch.
In this case, your anger is directed at a certain representational content, viz.
that your lunch has been stolen. Of course, it is also possible that you are in
fact happy about the fact that your lunch has been stolen, perhaps because
now you have a good excuse to have lunch at that nice place in town that
everyone is talking about. Whether or not you are happy or sad about this,
there is a phenomenal dierence that is not captured by the content to which
your aective state is directed. The question is whether this phenomenal
dierence can be cast in representational terms. As I have tried to explain,
this comes down to the question whether or not such phenomenal dierences
come with dierent truth-conditions.
So can emotions and moods be understood as in and of themselves truth-
conditional? On the face it, it seems they cannot. Although it is clear
that it can be either true or false that your lunch is stolen, a similar thing
does not seem to hold for your emotive state of anger that results from your
belief that it has. Indeed, it seems that emotions and moods rather concern
how we deal with things. That is, they pertain to how we react to things,
not how we represent things as being. Therefore, emotions and moods do
not seem to be truth-conditional, and hence, given what has been said, not
representational. What could it mean to talk about unfaithful reactions?
How things react to dierent circumstances cannot be evaluated in truth-
conditional terms. Therefore, even if in actual fact it is not true that your
lunch has been stolen, you can still be genuinely angry about it as long as
you falsely believe the contrary. Although that which your anger is directed
at can be a misrepresentation; the anger itself cannot. When you feel anger,
there is nothing external to your anger that could reveal the anger as illusory.
This is unlike the things you take yourself to see, for whether your vision of
the pink elephant is veridical does depend on how the external world is. This
does not seem to hold for aective states, for they are self-intimating; the
28I suspect that the reason why philosophers worry about whether or not emotions and
moods really are about something has to do with their purpose. If essentially emotions and
moods are not about anything, then what purpose do they serve? Happiness without a
reason is great, but also quite inexplicable. However, although this is a legitimate concern,
it is not relevant for the issue of whether strong representationalism can adequately account
for the phenomenal character of emotions and pains. After all, the phenomenal character
is in the emotions and moods themselves, not in the contents at which they are directed
(except, of course, when we are emotional about being emotional, or moody about being
moody).
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veridicality of their appearance is internal to the appearance itself. In short,
emotions and moods are real irrespective of whether or not they are directed
at misrepresentation.
Of course, we sometimes say that certain emotions are inappropriate, or
that certain continuously reoccurring moods are out of order. But these are
more like ethical or moral evaluations rather than truth-conditional ones.
They are judgments about actual events in the world, rather than judgments
about whether or not these events are adequately represented by representa-
tional systems. On the face of of it then, moods and emotions seem to resist
the strong representationalist's treatment.
Natural as it seems, the claim that emotions and moods are not truth-
conditional may nevertheless be contested. According to Michael Tye, emo-
tions and moods themselves are a kind of sensory representations (Tye; 1995).
Not only are emotions and moods typically directed at certain representa-
tional contents that concern states of aairs in the world, they also provide
representational content in and of themselves. Being in a state of anger
involves all kinds of bodily changes; e.g., blood pressure rises, the voice be-
comes louder, muscles get tensed etc. Such bodily changes can in principle
constitute the content of a misrepresentation. For example, it could be the
case that you merely dream all these things. In any case, it seems possible
that phenomenal representations might misrepresent such bodily conditions.
If emotions and moods are wholly exhausted by such bodily changes, then
emotions and moods ought to be considered fully truth-conditional after all.
Admittedly, Michael Tye has a very good point here. It is easy to over-
look the genuinely physiological aspects of emotions and moods. Whether or
not they are exhausted by these physiological aspects, however, is another
matter. Suce it to say that emotions and moods at least complicate the
unrestricted application of the representational thesis on phenomenal states.
To settle the issue, one could try to see whether there are perhaps other
more straightforward examples of phenomenal states that are not genuinely
truth-conditional (perhaps the state of imagining something?). But I shall
not pursue this here. Instead, I would like to continue elaborating on a point
that I already made earlier on, viz. the fact that, in the end, strong repre-
sentationalism may not be able to fully explain all aspects of phenomenal
character.
3.3 Explaining Phenomenal Character
As I have pointed out, strong representationalism aims to tell us what phe-
nomenal character is. I have also pointed out that accounting for phenomenal
character requires formulating an answer to the character question; what are
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the factors that determine or condition phenomenal character? Does strong
representationalism give a satisfactory answer to this question?
According to strong representationalism, phenomenal character is identi-
cal to representational content. It is this identication that is supposed to
give strong representationalism about phenomenal character its explanatory
power. This is partly because this identication involves a process of reduc-
tion; phenomenal character is reduced to how things are represented. That
is, apart from how things are represented to us, there is nothing else shaping
what phenomenal states are like. There are no phenomenal features that are
non-representational. And so, if strong representationalism is true, there are
no such things as qualia. Consequently, we do not have to worry that we
need to explain that which is by denition inexplicable.
The explanatory power of this reductive identication furthermore con-
sists in the fact that phenomenal character gets \kicked downstairs" into the
external world. From the strong representationalist's point of view, the phe-
nomenal qualities with which we are acquainted in consciousness are \out
there" in the world itself, rather than an exclusive product of a process of
phenomenal representation. Sights, sounds, smells, etc., are relegated to
the external physical world, and so technically speaking, their phenomenal
characters are not part of the explanandum that a theory of phenomenal con-
sciousness must account for. The only thing that matters is how the organism
represents certain contents to itself. The actual contents themselves are more
or less secondary. Phenomenal qualities are reduced to non-phenomenal fea-
tures in the physical environment, features that have the possibility of being
instantiated independently of being represented by conscious organisms. Be-
cause these features were already instantiated long before conscious creatures
entered the cosmic stage, a representational theory of phenomenal conscious-
ness does not need to account for them. Phenomenal consciousness is nothing
other than a process of representation, and since the contents that from time
to time accidentally enter into it are not intrinsic to this process, there is
no need to account for them in trying to explain the nature of phenome-
nal consciousness. Again, the issue is not how things appear, but that they
appear.
Promising as it seems, it is not that obvious that all aspects of phenome-
nal character can be accounted for in terms of this reduction. Even if colors,
sounds, tastes etc., can be reduced to physical features of the external world,
there will still remain certain phenomenal features that seem to resist such
reduction. They are the phenomenal features that come with the aective
states. They are the phenomenal aspects of bodily sensations, emotions,
and moods. It seems obvious that these cannot be relegated to the exter-
nal world, for they exclusively pertain to us as representing creatures. In a
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world in which there are no representing creatures it is impossible for there
to be such aective states, and therefore, in such a world the phenomenal
qualities that accompany such aective states can also not exist. As I have
already pointed out, the phenomenal aspects of aective states such as pains
are for their instantiation dependent on certain experiential processes. This
means that their phenomenal characters cannot be accounted for without
consideration for the representational processes that give rise to them. It is
only because certain representational processes occur that the phenomenal
aspects of aective states manifest themselves. Therefore, their phenomenal
character must at least in part be explained as a function of such processes.
How do strong representationalists deal with this? Fred Drestke has the
following to say about pain:
Pain is not a mental event that is made conscious by one's con-
sciousness of it. Just as a visual experience of a tree is an aware-
ness of a nonconscious object (the tree) the pain is an awareness of
a nonconscious bodily condition (an injured, strained, or diseased
part). The qualities that we are aware of when we experience pain
(thirst, hunger, nausea, etc.) are not qualities of a mental event;
they are properties of the physical state of the body an awareness
of which is the thirst, hunger or nausea...Though we can be { and
most often are { aware that we are in pain, pains, like visual ex-
periences, are awareness of objects, not objects of which we are
aware. (Dretske; 1995, p. 102-103)
Although Dretske seems to acknowledge that pain is essentially an aware-
ness of certain physiological conditions, he certainly does not say that pain-
experiences make us aware of anything other than non-conscious physiolog-
ical states. In other words, although pain-experiences (presumably certain
brain-states) are always instances of experiencing certain physiological dis-
turbances, that which is painful is, according to Dretske, not a feature of the
pain-experience itself but a feature of those physiological conditions that the
pain-experience is of. This is analogous to the claim that although a token of
a visual experience is always an awareness of certain shapes and colors; this
does not mean that this awareness itself has a particular shape and color.
Of course, this is just the thesis that experience is transparent. To say then
that pain-experiences are transparent is to say that the phenomenal char-
acter of a pain-experience is wholly exhausted by the manner in which the
experience represents certain physiological conditions. Over and above this,
nothing else is responsible for the painfulness of pains. Michael Tye gives a
similar account:
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Consider, for example, a pricking pain in the leg. Here, it seems
phenomenologically undeniable that pricking is experienced as a
feature tokened within the leg, and not as an intrinsic feature of
the experience itself. What is experienced as being pricked is a
part of the surface of the leg. (Tye; 1995, p. 113)
As is to be expected, the strategy that both Dretske and Tye adopt to
account for pain, is to reduce its phenomenal character to the way things
are represented. In this case physiological disturbances or tissue damages in
the body. Recall that the explanatory gap arises from the absolute dissimi-
larity that appears to exist between brain states and phenomenal states. If
the phenomenal character of aective states such as pain states can be suc-
cessfully reduced to non-phenomenal physiological states, then strong rep-
resentationalism oers a way to bridge the explanatory gap with respect to
phenomenal character. From the point of view of strong representationalism,
the ring of c-bers in the brain is not identical to the phenomenal sense of
pain. Rather, the ring of c-bers in the brain contingently represents, or
\tracks", non-phenomenal disturbances in the body. In other words, the issue
is not how phenomenal pain emerges from a physical brain-state, but how the
brain comes to represent certain physiological disturbances. And according
to strong representationalists, this latter problem is a lot more easy to solve
than the rst.29
Not only is strong representationalism about the phenomenal aspects of
aective states wrong, it also doesn't genuinely explain phenomenal character
even if it were true. First of all, as I have already pointed out, the phenom-
enal character of pains and other aective states cannot be accounted for
without reference to the representational/experiential processes that give
rise to them. Strong representationlists such as Dretske and Tye, how-
ever, seem to want to identify the representational contents of such aective
states with non-phenomenal physiological conditions that are representation-
independent. That is, they think that the phenomenal aspects of aective
states can be accounted for without reference to the representational econ-
omy in which these phenomenal aspects essentially gure. However, as I have
tried to make clear, these phenomenal aspects have no existence outside of
their representational context. In other words, their very existence depends
on phenomenal representation. So the phenomenal aspects of pains cannot be
identied with certain representation-independent physiological conditions.30
29See e.g. (Seager and Bourget; 2007), (Cutter and Tye; 2011), and (Bourget and
Mendelovici; 2013).
30See (Block; 2006) for a similar critique.
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To be sure, only in so far as representational contents are principally
taken to pertain to representation-independent conditions does strong repre-
sentationalism about aective states fail. However, one could perhaps allow
for the possibility that representational processes can sometimes have them-
selves as their content. Such representational contents might be said to be
self-referential. Indeed, one could say that bodily sensations, emotions, and
pains are representational states whose contents pertain exclusively to the
representational system itself qua representational system.31 In this way,
one could identify qualia with representational contents that represent repre-
sentational processes. Such contents have as their \subject matter" phenom-
enally conscious states of being, rather than non-phenomenal physical states
of aairs. If this makes sense, then one could say that even phenomenal
properties of experiences are in a way representational.
However, this will not save strong representationalism. Ultimately, the
issue is not whether the phenomenal aspects of phenomenal states are repre-
sentational or not. Even if they can be identied with certain kinds of repre-
sentational content, this does not explain their phenomenal character. Strong
representationalists can explain the phenomenal redness that you see when
you look at an apple by reducing it to a non-phenomenal, representation-
independent, feature of the physical environment. The redness is simply
\out there" and is not contingent upon your phenomenal consciousness of
it. However, the phenomenal aspects of bodily sensations, emotions, and
moods, are irreducibly phenomenal. And so they cannot be accounted for
by reducing them to something non-phenomenal. So even if the phenomenal
aspects of aective states are identied with representational content, this
identication is not explanatory because such representational contents are
still irreducibly phenomenal.
Interestingly, elsewhere Tye acknowledges that instances of painfulness
cannot be identied with bodily disturbances simpliciter. He says that we
should \. . . apply the term `pain' to tissue damage only in a certain con-
text|the context provided by tissue damage being represented by a token
of painE" (Tye; 2006, p. 166).
32 In other words, Tye acknowledges that pain
is indeed constituted by a process of representation. Nevertheless, he thinks
that this should not make us commit ourselves to the existence of qualia, for
he adds \Colors are identical with certain reectance patterns period. Pain
is not identical with tissue damage period. However, this dierence does not
require us to suppose that in the pain case, there are special, subjective qual-
31See e.g. (Kriegel; 2012) for an account of the notion of `self-representation'.
32Tye distinguishes between painO, which is the object of the pain experience, and
painE, which is the representational process that represents painO.
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ities of a sort not found in an objectivist story about color" (Tye; 2006, p.
171). In other words, Tye maintains that although pain is constituted by
representation, we do not need to posit any phenomenal properties of expe-
rience. However, this is mistaken; pain only exists as a function of certain
representational processes, and so they can be seen as phenomenal proper-
ties that belong to such representational processes.33 To conclude, strong
representionalism does not have the resources to accommodate phenomenal
states of a purely aective nature.
Strong representationalism aims to reduce the phenomenal aspects of af-
fective states to non-phenomenal representation-independent properties. Its
credibility as a theory of phenomenal character depends on whether or not
it succeeds in this. However, the qualitative aspects of bodily sensations,
emotions, and moods are irreducibly phenomenal. Although pains and other
aective states without a doubt have to do with physiological disturbances in
the body, they are nevertheless essentially conscious. Pain states and other
aective states are essentially states of conscious experience. Notwithstand-
ing strong representationalism, and its appeal to transparency, their phenom-
enal characters are in essence properties of certain experiences, properties
that are dependent on the goings-on of representational processes. Strong
representationalism does not bridge the gap between the physical and the
character of the phenomenal. Perhaps there is no satisfactory explanation of
why certain representational processes give rise to their own peculiar char-
acter. Perhaps it is just a brute fact that some physical processes give rise
to purely experiential properties of experience. Perhaps! But if this is the
case, we should not resist, as strong representationalists do, but rest content
in our ignorance.
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